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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case  
 Philip Milton Ruggiero appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty of three counts of preparing false 
evidence.  Ruggiero contends the district court erred in two of its evidentiary 
rulings.  
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In Ada County Case No. CR-MD-2011-13936, the state charged Ruggiero 
with stalking.1  (See #401752 R., p.80.)  In that case, three letters were submitted 
to the magistrate that were typewritten and were purportedly from Lisa 
Roggenbuck, the victim of the alleged stalking, a “Spearmint Rhino Bouncer,” 
and Jenn Higginson.  (#40175 R., pp.11-13, 80.)  All three letters support the 
proposition that Ruggiero was not guilty of the stalking charge alleged in Case 
No. CR-MD-2011-13936.  (Id.)   
Based on the three letters submitted in Case No. CR-MD-2011-13936, the 
state charged Ruggiero with three counts of preparing false evidence in violation 
of I.C. § 18-2602.  (#40175 R., pp.41-43.)  Prior to trial, the state filed a notice 
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) indicating its intent to introduce evidence of the stalking 
                                                 
1 According to ICourt Portal, Ruggiero’s stalking case was resolved with Ruggiero 
pleading guilty to an amended charge of disturbing the peace. 
 
2 Pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court’s order, the record in this appeal has 
been augmented with “the Clerk’s Record, Reporter’s Transcript and the 
Magistrate Transcript filed as an Exhibit” from Ruggiero’s prior appeal, State v. 
Ruggiero, Docket No. 40175 (Ada County Case No. CR-2012-2301).”  (R., p.2.)  
The prior appeal resulted in the reversal of the district court’s ruling that I.C. § 18-
2602 violated Ruggiero’s First Amendment rights.  State v. Ruggiero, 156 Idaho 
662, 330 P.3d 408 (Ct. App. 2014).  
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charge “to provide context of [Ruggiero’s] intent and motive” in relation to 
submitting false evidence in that case.  (R., pp.40-41.)  At the hearing on the 
state’s notice, the prosecutor indicated he did not “intend to belabor any of the 
underlying facts or circumstances,” but only intended to use the evidence “to 
establish the elements of the case.”  (6/18/2015 Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.3.)  The 
district court stated it was “not even sure” that I.R.E. 404(b) applied because it 
was “absolutely essential to the cause of action.”  (6/18/2015 Tr., p.10, Ls.18-22; 
see also p.11, Ls.6-8 (“[T]here’s utterly no way to avoid this.  It’s part of the 
charge itself.  It is essential.”).)  Defense counsel did not file a written response to 
the state’s notice, nor did she object to the evidence at the I.R.E. 404(b) hearing.  
(See generally R.; 6/18/2015 Tr., pp.10-12.)  In fact, when asked at the hearing if 
she had any comments, defense counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.”  
(6/18/2015 Tr., p.11, Ls.4-5.)  At trial, however, Ruggiero objected to the 
admission of evidence regarding the nature of his prior stalking case, and, in the 
middle of trial, Ruggiero offered to stipulate that there was a prior proceeding.  
(Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.15-19, p.170, L.23 – p.171, L.3.)  The court overruled 
Ruggiero’s objection finding the existence of the stalking case was relevant, and 
not unduly prejudicial, but agreed that it was unnecessary “to go heavily into the 
details.”  (Trial Tr., p.169, L.20 – p.170, L.2, p.171, Ls.4-13.)   
Ruggiero also objected to the admission of the three letters, claiming the 
state failed to lay foundation establishing he was the author of the letters.  (Trial. 
Tr., p.108, Ls.2-19; see also p.202, Ls.19-21 (motion to strike letters).)  The court 
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overruled Ruggiero’s objections.  (Trial Tr., p.108, L.20 – p.109, L.11; see also 
p.202, L.22 – p.203, L.3 (motion to strike denied).)          
The jury found Ruggiero guilty of all three counts of preparing false 
evidence.  (R., pp.93-95.)  The court imposed concurrent unified sentences of 
five years, with one year fixed, but suspended the sentences and placed 
Ruggiero on probation.  (R., pp.106-109.)  Ruggiero filed a timely notice of 
appeal.  (R., pp.112-114.)      
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ISSUES 
 Ruggiero states the issues on appeal as:  
I. Did the trial court err in allowing witnesses for the 
prosecution to testify regarding past charges without 
performing the required balancing test to determine 
relevance and prejudicial effect? 
 
II. Did the trial court err in admitting letters into evidence 
without authentication to support a finding that the letters are 
what the state claimed them to be? 
  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. To the extent Ruggiero’s evidentiary objections are preserved, has 
he failed to show the district court erred in admitting the objected-to testimony 
regarding his prior stalking charge? 
 
2. Has Ruggiero failed to show the district court erred in concluding 
the state presented sufficient foundation for the admission of the three false 
letters Ruggiero submitted in his stalking case? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Ruggiero Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Ruling That Limited 
Evidence That Ruggiero Was Charged With Stalking In A Previous Case Was 
Relevant To Establish The Elements Of Falsifying Evidence In Relation To That 
Case 
 
A. Introduction 
  
Ruggiero contends the admission of “detailed testimony regarding [his] 
past stalking charge violated the applicable legal standards required by I.R.E. 
404(b).”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.5 (bold omitted).)  Ruggiero further asserts “the trial 
court erred in admitting thorough and persistent testimony of a prior charge, even 
though the name and nature of the past offense created a risk of a verdict 
influenced by prejudicial considerations.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)  Ruggiero’s 
arguments fail for at least two reasons.  First, to the extent his complaints are not 
preserved, this Court should decline to consider them.  Second, application of the 
correct legal standards to the facts shows the district court did not err in admitting 
limited evidence that Ruggiero was previously charged with stalking because 
such evidence was necessary to establish the elements of the charged offense of 
falsifying evidence.  Even if there was error in the admission of the evidence to 
which Ruggiero actually objected, any error was harmless.     
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Relevance is a question of law reviewed de novo, while balancing under 
I.R.E. 403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 
190, 254 P.3d 77, 91 (Ct. App. 2011).  Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are also 
reviewed under a bifurcated standard: whether the evidence is admissible for a 
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purpose other than propensity is given free review while the determination of 
whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its 
potential for unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. 
Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009).  In reviewing a trial court’s 
discretionary decision, this Court evaluates whether the trial court correctly 
perceived the decision as discretionary, whether the trial court acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion and consistent with legal standards, and whether the 
court exercised reason in making its decision.  Norton, 151 Idaho at 190, 254 
P.3d at 91.      
 
C. Ruggiero Has Failed To Establish Error In The Admission Of Any Of The 
Evidence Of His Prior Stalking Case To Which He Actually Objected  
 
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant.  I.R.E. 401, 402.  Evidence 
that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has 
any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it would be 
without the evidence, is relevant.  State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 768 P.2d 
807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989).  “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove a defendant’s criminal propensity.  However, such evidence 
may be admissible for a purpose other than that prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b).”  
State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations 
omitted).  Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts may be admitted 
to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.  I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 
845 P.2d 1211 (1993).  “[E]vidence runs afoul of Rule 404(b) only if its purpose is 
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to ‘prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in 
conformity therewith.’”  State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190, 254 P.3d 77, 91 (Ct. 
App. 2011) (quoting I.R.E. 404(b)).     
In order to prove Ruggiero was guilty of falsifying evidence in violation of 
I.C. § 18-2602, the state was required to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that Ruggiero (1) “prepared a false paper or instrument in writing”; (2) “with the 
intent to produce it or allow it to be produced for any fraudulent or deceitful 
purpose as genuine or true, to wit, a false letter”; and (3) “upon any trial, 
proceeding or inquiry, authorized by law.”  (R., pp.83-85.)3  Thus, the elements of 
the offense required the state to present evidence of a “trial, proceeding or 
inquiry, authorized by law,” which was Ruggiero’s prior stalking case, as well as 
evidence of Ruggiero’s intent in submitting the false letters in that case.  
Ruggiero apparently recognized as much given his acquiescence in the state’s 
pre-trial I.R.E. 404(b) motion in which the state indicated its intent “to admit 
evidence of the underlying criminal charge to provide context [for Ruggiero’s] 
intent and motive.”  (R., pp.40-41; see generally 6/18/2015 Tr.)  Where evidence 
of a prior offense is necessary to establish one of the elements of the charged 
offense, the evidence is relevant and cannot be subject to exclusion under I.R.E. 
404(b).  
Notwithstanding his pre-trial acquiescence to the state’s I.R.E. 404(b) 
notice, Ruggiero did raise some objections during trial with respect to his prior 
                                                 
3 Because there were three separate false letters purportedly from different 
authors (Exhibits 1, 2, 3), there were three separate jury instructions for each 
count.   
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stalking case.  (See, e.g., Trial Tr., p.99, L.20 – p.100, L.9 (objecting to any 
testimony from the prosecutor in the stalking case, claiming she did not “have 
anything with regard to the elements of the case”), p.169, Ls.15-19 (objecting to 
evidence relating to the nature of the relationship between Ruggiero and the 
victim in the stalking case), p.170, L.23 – p.171, L.1 (objecting to testimony from 
the victim in the stalking case regarding certain actions taken by Ruggiero).)  
However, it is unclear exactly what evidence Ruggiero is complaining of on 
appeal since he does not specifically cite any testimony or any particular 
objection as part of his I.R.E. 404(b) argument.  (See generally Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.5-10.)  Instead, he generally asserts that “testimony regarding a prior stalking 
charge is not relevant to the currently charged offense.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)  
Ruggiero did not make such a general objection before or during trial.  Rather, he 
only objected to specific portions of testimony.  Ruggiero’s general appellate 
assertion that no evidence related to his prior stalking charge was relevant or 
admissible is not preserved.  State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 
414, 435 (2009) (citation omitted) (“As a general rule, we will not consider 
arguments made for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 457, 
459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989) (“an objection on one ground will not be 
deemed sufficient to preserve for appeal all objections that could have been 
raised”).  Moreover, this Court should decline Ruggiero’s implicit invitation to 
“search the record on appeal for error.”  Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 
Idaho 375, 383, 234 P.3d 699, 707 (2010) (citation omitted).  It is Ruggiero’s 
burden to show error; it is not the state’s or the Court’s job to look for it on his 
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behalf.  Id. (“[T]o the extent that an assignment of error is not argued and 
supported in compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived.”); Norton, 151 
Idaho at 183, 254 P.3d at 84 (“This Court will not pore through a trial transcript 
and evaluate each question and answer in order to determine whether there is 
objectionable material, let alone add them up and analyze them as a collective 
due process violation.”).     
Even if this Court elects to examine Ruggiero’s specific trial objections 
made in relation to evidence from his stalking case, and the district court’s rulings 
thereon, review of those objections and rulings shows no error by the district 
court.4  Ruggiero made two specific objections during Lisa Roggenbuck’s 
testimony.  (Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.17-19, p.170, L.23 – p.171, L.3.)  Lisa was the 
victim in the stalking case and the purported author of one of the false letters 
submitted in that case.  (Trial Tr., p.118, L.2 – p.119, L.10, p.122, L.15 – p.123, 
L.3; Exhibit 1.)  Lisa testified that she was “one of the entertainers” at the 
Spearmint Rhino, which is where she met Ruggiero when he came in as a 
customer.  (Trial Tr., p.167, L.19 – p.168, L.8.)  Lisa described her relationship 
with Ruggiero as a “business relationship,” but not a friendship.  (Trial Tr., p.169, 
Ls.9-14.)  When asked whether the relationship ever changed, or whether 
“conduct ever escalate[d],” Ruggiero objected, arguing the prospective evidence 
                                                 
4 The state’s discussion of Ruggiero’s objections does not include his motion to 
exclude any testimony from the prosecutor in the stalking case because that 
objection was not based on I.R.E. 404(b), nor was it an objection to any particular 
testimony by that witness.  (Trial Tr., p.99, L.20 – p.100, L.9.)  Rather, it was a 
general “relevance” objection.  (Trial Tr., p.100, Ls.5-9.)  Absent any specific 
argument by Ruggiero with respect to the prosecutor’s testimony, the state 
should not be expected to construct a response.   
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was “prejudicial” and “ha[d] no relevance to anything to do with this case.”  (Trial 
Tr., p.169, Ls.15-19.)  The court overruled the objection, stating: 
Well, because the nature of the charge is that there was 
preparation of false evidence for a proceeding, then it is relevant 
and admissible to discuss that there was a proceeding. 
 
So I will allow counsel to proceed.  It is relevant.  And I don’t 
think it’s unduly prejudicial.  It’s something we addressed pretrial. 
 
(Trial Tr., p.169, L.20 – p.170, L.2.)   
 Ruggiero objected again a few questions later after Lisa testified that she 
called law enforcement “on the day that [Ruggiero] told [her] he had [her] license 
plate memorized,” recited it to her, and “described the clothes that [she] was 
wearing.”  (Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.15-22.)  In response to that answer, Ruggiero 
objected, stated he would “stipulate there was a proceeding” and argued:  “We 
can’t retry what happened.  And this is already trying to turn this into a stalking 
case.  And, at this point, we’ll stipulate there was a court proceeding or a court 
filed [sic].”  (Trial Tr., p.170, L.23 – p.171, L.3.)  The district court responded:   
I don’t think we need to go heavily into the details, Counsel.  
 
So it is relevant that there was a stalking case, because it’s 
necessary there be a trial or proceeding.  And a stalking case 
would be such.   
 
And so I see it is relevant and admissible.  And I’m not going 
to strike the witness’s response.  But I think that it might be useful 
to get more directly to the proceeding. 
 
(Trial Tr., p.171, Ls.4-13.)  The prosecutor then “move[d] on.”  (Trial Tr., p.171, 
Ls.14-15.) 
 On appeal, Ruggiero contends the district court’s admission of evidence of 
Ruggiero’s “prior stalking charge” violated I.R.E. 404(b) because the evidence 
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was “not relevant to the currently charged offense,” “the prosecution failed to 
establish the past stalking charge as fact,” and “[p]roviding the jury with the name 
and details of [his] past stalking charge unfairly prejudiced [him].”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, pp.7-9, 11.)  The most obvious flaw in Ruggiero’s argument on appeal is 
that he did not make an I.R.E. 404(b) objection at trial.  He only argued the 
evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial.  “[A]n objection on one ground will not be 
deemed sufficient to preserve for appeal all objections that could have been 
raised.”  Stevens, 115 Idaho at 459, 767 P.2d at 834.  An appeal is not the 
opportunity for trial counsel to raise objections she did not make at trial.  
Ruggiero’s I.R.E. 404(b) complaint in relation to Lisa’s testimony is not 
preserved.  See State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 72, 44 P.3d 1122, 1127 (2002) 
(“Because [Cannady] did not base his objection upon Rule 404(b) of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence, and such an objection was not apparent from the context, 
Cannady has not preserved that issue for appeal.”).  The same is true for 
Ruggiero’s complaint that it was unfairly prejudicial to “[p]rovide the jury with the 
name” of his stalking charge because Ruggiero never objected to the jury 
knowing the name of the offense.   
 Ruggiero’s argument that the court erred by admitting evidence of his past 
stalking charge because “the prosecution failed to establish the past stalking 
charge as fact” fails not only because Ruggiero never made an I.R.E. 404(b) 
objection, but also because, even if he had, the requirement that a trial court 
“make a specific articulation as to whether there is sufficient evidence that the 
prior conduct occurred” arises “only if that question is squarely at issue.”  State v. 
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Marks, 156 Idaho 559, 565, 328 P.3d 539, 545 (Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted).  
The question of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Ruggiero’s 
“prior bad acts as fact” was never “squarely at issue” in this case because 
Ruggiero did not challenge the facts underlying the stalking charge.  His failure to 
do so is consistent with the conclusion that he did not object to the evidence 
under I.R.E. 404(b).   
 With respect to Ruggiero’s prejudice argument, the only objection to 
prejudice was in response to the question:  “Did the relationship ever change, or 
did conduct ever escalate?”  (Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.15-19.)  Even assuming the 
objection to this question was adequate to cover Lisa’s answer two questions 
later that Ruggiero “started to think” they “had a relationship together,” and they 
“were going to get married,” this testimony was relevant and not unfairly 
prejudicial.  The testimony was relevant because it provided the context for 
initiating the stalking case, i.e., the proceeding in which Ruggiero submitted the 
falsified letters, which was an element of the charged offense in this case.  The 
testimony was also relevant because it gave context to the statements made in 
the falsified letters and was evidence of Ruggiero’s intent in writing the letters.5  
(See Trial Tr., p.174, L.4 – p.175, L.6 (Lisa reads false letter purportedly written 
by her).)   
Lisa’s objected-to testimony would only be subject to exclusion as unfairly 
prejudicial if it suggested decision on an improper basis.  State v. Floyd, 125 
                                                 
5 The falsified letters were admitted at trial, but are not included in the record on 
appeal.  (See R., p.130 (Certificate of Exhibits listing only the Presentence 
Investigation Report as an exhibit).)  
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Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1994).  As previously explained by 
the Idaho Supreme Court:  “Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  
The rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant evidence.”  
State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) 
(emphasis in original).  That the evidence of Ruggiero’s prior conduct toward Lisa 
was unflattering does not mean it was unfairly prejudicial.  See State v. Leavitt, 
116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) (“Certainly that evidence was 
prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial is 
demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in 
prejudice to a defendant.”).  Given the relevance of the evidence, indeed the 
necessity of the evidence to satisfy the elements of the charged offense, any 
prejudice was not unfair.   
Ruggiero attempts to bolster his prejudice argument by claiming that any 
prejudice could have been avoided by accepting his willingness to stipulate to the 
existence of a prior proceeding.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)  More specifically, 
Ruggiero contends the district court “erred by admitting evidence of the past 
stalking charge, since [he] repeatedly offered to stipulate to the fact that there 
existed a past proceeding; which was an element the prosecution needed to 
prove,” and agreed “to stipulate to the only relevant information.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, pp.9, 12.)  Contrary to I.A.R. 35(a)(6), Ruggiero does not provide any 
citations to the record to support his claims.  I.A.R. 35(a)(6) (“The argument shall 
contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on 
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appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to . . . parts of the transcript and 
record relied on.”).  The trial transcript reflects that, after his second objection to 
Lisa’s testimony, Ruggiero stated, “at this point, we’ll stipulate there was a court 
proceeding or a court filed [sic].”  (Trial Tr., p.171, Ls.2-3.)  It is unclear how this 
“offer,” made in the middle of testimony from the fourth state’s witness, reflects a 
“repeated” offer to stipulate to the existence of a prior proceeding, or what 
“relevant information” Ruggiero believes was included in this offer.  It is also 
worth noting that, at trial, one of the key themes of Ruggiero’s defense was that 
there was no proceeding as contemplated by the elements of preparing false 
evidence.  (See, e.g., Trial Tr., p.241, L.24 – p.242, L.3 (cautioning the jury not to 
“muddle through element No. 5 and pretend like it doesn’t matter”); see R., 
pp.83-85 (element 5 of the jury instructions states “upon any trial, proceeding or 
inquiry, authorized by law”).)  
Notwithstanding the factual flaws in Ruggiero’s argument that he suffered 
prejudice because the court did not allow him to stipulate to the existence of a 
prior proceeding, his offer to stipulate has no bearing on whether he was, in fact, 
unfairly prejudiced by Lisa’s objected-to testimony.  For the reasons already 
stated, he has failed to meet his burden of showing unfair prejudice.  The 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), 
upon which Ruggiero relies, does not change this conclusion.  (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.11-12.)               
The defendant in Old Chief was charged with violating a federal statute 
that prohibited an individual with a prior qualifying conviction from possessing a 
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firearm.  519 U.S. at 174.  Old Chief sought to preclude the Government from 
introducing evidence of his prior conviction “except to state that [he] had been 
convicted of” a qualifying offense.  Id. (emphasis omitted).  Old Chief offered to 
“stipulate to the fact of the prior conviction” and argued that, by doing so, “the 
name and nature of the offense [was] inadmissible under Rule 403 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, the danger being that the unfair prejudice from that evidence 
would substantially outweigh its probative value.”  Id. at 175.  With respect to the 
evidentiary issues presented in relation to evidence of Old Chief’s prior 
conviction, the Supreme Court held that “[a] documentary record of the 
conviction” was relevant because it made Old Chief’s status under the charged 
offense “more probable than it would have been without the evidence.”  Id. at 
179.  Addressing the prejudice prong of the evidentiary analysis under F.R.E. 
403, the Court noted that the “prior-conviction element” of the charged offense 
“generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice,” but “[t]hat risk will vary from case to 
case,” depending on the nature of the prior conviction relative to the nature of the 
defendant’s pending charges.  Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186.  The Court also noted 
that a party’s willingness to concede an element is “pertinent to the court’s 
discretion to exclude evidence on the point conceded.”  Id. at 184.  Weighing the 
potential prejudice associated with admitting evidence of the name and nature of 
Old Chief’s prior conviction against Old Chief’s willingness to stipulate to the fact 
of conviction, the Court found there was “no cognizable difference between the 
evidentiary significance of an admission and of the legitimately probative 
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component of the official record the prosecution would prefer to place in 
evidence.”  Id. at 191.  The Court concluded: 
For purposes of the Rule 403 weighing of the probative against the 
prejudicial, the functions of the competing evidence are 
distinguishable only by the risk inherent in the one and wholly 
absent from the other.  In this case, as in any other in which the 
prior conviction is for an offense likely to support conviction on 
some improper ground, the only reasonable conclusion was that 
the risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh the discounted 
probative value of the record of conviction, and it was an abuse of 
discretion to admit the record when an admission was available.  
What we have said shows why this will be the general rule when 
proof of convict status is at issue, just as the prosecutor’s choice 
will generally survive a Rule 403 analysis when a defendant seeks 
to force the substitution of an admission for evidence creating a 
coherent narrative of his thoughts and actions in perpetrating the 
offense for which he is being tried. 
 
Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191-192.  
 The only “general rule” supported by Old Chief is that, when the existence 
of a prior conviction is an element of a charged offense, the record of the prior 
conviction should be excluded if the defendant is willing to stipulate to the 
existence of the conviction.  Id.  Otherwise, Old Chief endorses balancing the 
probative value of evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice when 
responding to an objection under Rule 403, which is what the district court did in 
this case when Ruggiero made an objection based on prejudice.  As previously 
noted, the district court correctly balanced the probative value against the danger 
of unfair prejudice.  Ruggiero’s eventual offer to stipulate to the fact of the prior 
proceeding did not change the balance given the timing of his offer to do so, 
which was after the jury had already been apprised, through other witnesses, of 
the existence of a prior stalking case.  Forcing the state to accept the stipulation 
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at the time it was offered, instead of allowing the state to tell it’s “story,” which is 
a legitimate consideration under Old Chief, would have also created confusion 
given Ruggiero’s efforts to establish, through an earlier witness, that there was 
no proceeding.  (Trial Tr., p.149, L.14 – p.150, L.25.)  Avoiding confusion is also 
a relevant consideration when balancing the admissibility of evidence under Rule 
403.  Moreover, any stipulation to the existence of the prior proceeding would 
have been ineffective in addressing the relevance of the limited factual basis for 
the stalking charge, which was to show that the content of the letters was false 
and to show Ruggiero’s intent in writing the letters.  Ruggiero’s reliance on Old 
Chief to support his prejudice argument is unpersuasive.            
In his final argument regarding prejudice, Ruggiero asserts the district 
court “abused its discretion when it failed to conduct a balancing test to 
determine whether the evidence of [his] past stalking charge had a prejudicial 
effect that outweighed its probative value.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.14.)  For the first 
time, Ruggiero actually directs the Court to the objection that led to the ruling he 
challenges.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.14 (citing Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.20-23).)  The 
objection was the first one he made during Lisa’s testimony when she was asked 
whether her relationship with him ever escalated.  (Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.15-19.)  
The objection was “prejudicial” and “no relevance.”  (Id.)  The  court responded to 
this objection as follows:       
Well, because the nature of the charge is that there was 
preparation of false evidence for a proceeding, then it is relevant 
and admissible to discuss that there was a proceeding. 
 
So I will allow counsel to proceed.  It is relevant.  And I don’t 
think it’s unduly prejudicial.  It’s something we addressed pretrial. 
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(Trial Tr., p.169, L.20 – p.170, L.2.) 
 On appeal, Ruggiero quotes the first paragraph of the court’s ruling, but 
not the second paragraph in which the court specially states:  “I don’t think it’s 
unduly prejudicial.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.14.)  Instead, Ruggiero argues that the 
district court “simply” found the evidence relevant without balancing the evidence 
under I.R.E. 403.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-14.)  Ruggiero either ignores the 
district court’s specific ruling regarding prejudice because it directly contradicts 
his claim, or he failed to read the entirety of the court’s ruling.  Either way, his 
argument that the district court failed to conduct an I.R.E. 403 analysis is 
contradicted by the record. 
 To the extent his evidentiary claims are preserved, Ruggiero has failed to 
show any error in the admission of Lisa’s testimony.   
 
D. Even If This Court Concludes Ruggiero Has Met His Burden Of Showing 
Evidentiary Error, Any Such Error Is Harmless 
 
Even if this Court concludes that any of Lisa’s objected-to testimony 
should have been excluded, the error is harmless.  Idaho Criminal Rule 52 
provides that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect 
substantial rights shall be disregarded.”  I.C.R. 52.  The relevant inquiry “is 
whether the complained-of error contributed to the verdict, or whether it was 
unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered.”  State v. Neyhart, 
160 Idaho 748, ---, 378 P.3d 1045, 1055 (Ct. App. 2016).   
Lisa’s objected-to testimony related limited information regarding 
Ruggiero’s conduct that resulted in the underlying criminal proceeding in which 
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Ruggiero submitted false evidence.  When considered in relation to all the other 
evidence the jury considered, this Court can easily conclude that Lisa’s objected-
to testimony did not contribute to the verdict.   
Christine Starr testified that a falsified letter was submitted in relation to a 
stalking case against Ruggiero in which Lisa was the victim.  (Trial Tr., p.118, L.2 
– p.119, L.10, p.120, Ls.5-13.)   
The Honorable Thomas Watkins, who presided over the stalking case, 
also testified that he received the letters in relation to a second-degree stalking 
case against Ruggiero.  (Trial Tr., p.135, L.22 – p.136, L.9, p.138, L.23 – p.139, 
L.8.)   
Kristy Wood, Ruggiero’s ex-wife, testified that, during the time the letters 
were sent, she saw Ruggiero typing documents at home on his typewriter, and 
she specifically saw the letter that was purportedly written by Lisa (Exhibit 1).  
(Trial Tr., p.157, L.10 – p.158, L.24, p.159, L.21 – p.160, L.4.)  Kristy also 
testified that she took Ruggiero, at his request, to buy perfume to spray on one of 
the letters, and she witnessed him spraying the letter purportedly written by Lisa.  
(Trial Tr., p.159, L.3 – p.160, L.10.)  Ruggiero told Kristy he sprayed the letters 
“[s]o that it would smell like a female.”  (Trial Tr., p.164, Ls.2-11.)       
Lisa also testified, without objection, that she did not write the letter 
purportedly authored by her, the contents of the letter were generally false, and 
the letter referred to certain behavior by Ruggiero.  (Trial Tr., p.172, L.14 - p.176, 
L.17.) 
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Finally, Detective Angela Munson testified that Ruggiero ultimately 
acknowledged that he wrote the letters in order to “get out of trouble.”  (Trial Tr., 
p.187, L.20 – p.188, L.11.)   
That the jury received a limited amount of detail regarding the nature of 
the conduct underlying the stalking charge did not, in light of the other evidence 
presented, contribute to the jury’s verdict that Ruggiero submitted false letters in 
the stalking proceeding.    
 
II. 
Ruggiero Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Overruling His Foundation Objections To The False Letters 
  
A. Introduction 
Ruggiero contends that the district court abused its discretion in overruling 
his foundation objections to the admission of the false letters that formed the 
factual basis of the three preparing false evidence charges.  (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.14-16.)  Ruggiero’s argument fails because the record reveals that the state 
satisfied the evidentiary foundation requirements for admission of the three 
letters.  
 
B. Standard Of Review  
 
“Whether there is proper foundation upon which to admit evidence is a 
matter within the trial court’s discretion.”  State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 96, 334 
P.3d 280, 287 (2014) (citation omitted). 
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C. The State Presented Adequate Foundation For The Admission Of The 
Three Fake Letters 
 
Foundation for evidence is governed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 901, 
which provides:  The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding 
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.  I.R.E. 901(a).  “By way 
of illustration,” but “not by way of limitation,” the rule provides that the foundation 
requirements can be met through “[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that a 
matter is what it is claimed to be,” I.R.E. 901(b)(1), and when there exists 
“distinctive characteristics,” such as “[a]ppearance, contents, substance, [or] 
internal patterns . . ., taken in conjunction with circumstances,” I.R.E. 901(b)(4).  
“[C]ircumstantial evidence establishing that the evidence was what the proponent 
claimed” is sufficient for purposes of foundation under I.R.E. 901.  State v. Koch, 
157 Idaho 89, 96, 334 P.3d 280, 287 (2014) (citing cases); State v. Silverson, 
130 Idaho 283, 285, 939 P.2d 859, 861 (Ct. App. 1997) (“[W]ritten and signed 
documents, like any other type of evidence, may be authenticated through any 
means ‘which is sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what 
its proponent claims.’  I.R.E. 901(a).  This may include authentication through 
circumstantial evidence.”).  
 Prior to trial, Ruggiero moved to exclude Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, the three 
false letters, arguing that he “didn’t believe that the State would be able to 
authenticate th[e] letters.”  (Trial Tr., p.108, Ls.3-6; see also p.108, Ls.18-19 (“I 
don’t think they can authenticate them.”).)  The district court declined Ruggiero’s 
in limine request, correctly concluding that the state would have the opportunity 
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to lay the foundation at trial.  (Trial Tr., p.108, L.20 – p.109, L.11.)  During trial, 
the court admitted the letters “subject to being stricken” absent further 
foundation.  (Trial Tr., p.141, L.18 – p.142, L.9.)  At the conclusion of the trial, the 
district court concluded there was adequate foundation for admission of the 
letters “without limitation.”  (Trial Tr., p.202, L.22 – p.203, L.3.)           
 Ruggiero contends the false letters “lacked proper foundation and were 
erroneously admitted into evidence” because the false letters “did not contain a 
signature,” and were not “created under an official duty to maintain records of 
service.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.16.)  Ruggiero further argues the “state failed to 
offer convincing enough circumstantial evidence to substantiate the claim the 
letters were actually written by [him] and properly authenticated under I.R.E. 
901.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.16.)  Ruggiero’s arguments fail for at least two 
reasons. 
 First, adequate foundation for the letters did not require a “signature” or 
evidence that the letters were “created under an official duty to maintain records 
of service.”  While such evidence would be proper foundation, I.R.E. 901 does 
not require such evidence in order to lay foundation.  Indeed, the rule expressly 
states that, even the “examples of authentication or identification conforming with 
the requirements of th[e] rule” set forth in I.R.E. 901(b)(1)-(10), are only 
illustrative and not exclusive.  I.R.E. 901(b); Koch, 157 Idaho at 96, 334 P.3d at 
287 (“Rule 901(b) contains an illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of suggested 
methods of identification.”).     
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 Second, the test for adequate foundation based on circumstantial 
evidence is not whether it was “convincing enough.”  The test is whether the 
evidence is “sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims.”  I.R.E. 901(a).  That standard was satisfied in this case.  The 
proponent of the letters – the state – claimed the letters were submitted to the 
judge in Ruggiero’s stalking case and provided evidence to that effect.  The 
evidence supporting the foundation for that claim included Christine Starr’s 
testimony that she received Exhibit 1 in the context of Ruggiero’s stalking case 
(Trial Tr., p.119, L.17 – p.120, L.25), and Judge Watkins’ testimony that he 
received Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 in relation to Ruggiero’s stalking case (Trial Tr., 
p.135, L.22 – p.136, L.9, p.138, L.23 – p.139, L.8).  That was all that was 
required in order to lay foundation for admission of the three letters.  Although the 
state was required to prove that Ruggiero submitted the letters, and that the 
letters were false, in order to prove Ruggiero was guilty of the charged offenses 
(R., pp.83-85), such evidence was not required as part of the foundation for 
admission of the letters.  Ruggiero’s claim to the contrary fails.   
 Even if the state was required to establish, as a component of foundation, 
that Ruggiero was the author of the letters, that standard was also satisfied.  
Kristy Woody testified that Ruggiero owned a typewriter, she saw him typing 
documents during the relevant time period, she specifically saw the letter 
admitted as Exhibit 1, which purported to be from Lisa, and she saw Ruggiero 
spray perfume on it so it would “smell like a female.”  (Trial Tr., p.156, L.2 – 
p.160, L.4, p.164, Ls.2-11.)  Lisa testified that the contents of Exhibit 1 were 
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factually false, and that she did not author Exhibit 1.  (Trial Tr., p.172, L.14 – 
p.176, L.21.)  Finally, Detective Munson testified that Ruggiero acknowledged 
that he wrote the letters in an effort to “get out of trouble.”  (Trial Tr., p.187, L.24 
– p.188, L.11.)  Detective Munson also noted the similarities between the letters, 
which made her suspect all three letters “were written by the same person.”  
(Trial Tr., p.182, L.8 – p.183, L.23.)  Those similarities included the same 
“general letter writing format,” they all “had the case number at the top of the 
letter,” “there were misspellings on all three of them,” “none of them had 
signatures or handwritten signatures at the bottom,” “they were all written around 
the same timeframe,” and “they were all addressed to Judge Watkins.”  (Trial Tr., 
p.183, L.24 – p.184, L.11.)  In other words, all three letters had “distinctive 
characteristics” indicating they were written by the same author (Ruggiero), for 
the same purpose (to improperly influence the resolution of his stalking case).  
The district court correctly concluded that this evidence was more than adequate 
to support the foundational prerequisite that Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 were what the 
state claimed, i.e., false letters submitted by Ruggiero in his stalking case.6  
Compare Koch, 157 Idaho at 97-99, 334 P.3d at 288-290 (recognizing that 
content may be considered in assessing foundation); State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 
814, 817, 186 P.3d 670, 673 (Ct. App. 2008) (“The Idaho Rules of Evidence d[o] 
                                                 
6 To the extent the actual letters are necessary to consider whether there was 
adequate foundation for their admission, as noted, the letters themselves are not 
included in the record on appeal.  (See R., p.130.)  The “appellant bears the 
burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can review 
the merits of the claims of error, and where pertinent portions of the record are 
missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court.”  
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34, 981 P.2d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 1999) (citations 
omitted).   
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not require the state to present expert testimony or forensic evidence 
establishing that [a particular individual] authored [a document] in order to 
properly authenticate [it].”).     
Ruggiero has failed to meet his burden of showing the district court erred 
in admitting Exhibits 1, 2, and 3.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding Ruggiero guilty of three counts of preparing false 
evidence.   
 DATED this 26th day of October, 2016. 
 
 
       _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello______ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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